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Gray Market Importation a Result of
Gray Statutory Language or Judicial
Legislation?
I. Introduction
Gray market goods are those goods manufactured in a for-
eign country, bearing a legitimate United States trademark,
which are imported into the United States without the permis-
sion of the United States trademark owner.1 Section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the importation of "merchandise of
foreign manufacture" bearing "a trademark owned by a citizen
of, or by a corporation.., organized within, the United States"
without the permission of the U.S. trademark owner.2 Neverthe-
less, the current Customs Service regulations, 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(c),' allow importation of gray market goods that meet the
"common-control"'4 or "authorized-use '" 5 exceptions to the exclu-
sionary protection provided by Section 526. The issue before the
Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc." was whether the Cus-
toms Service's interpretation of Section 526 of the Tariff Act of
1. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986). Gray market goods are products "bear[ing] a 'genuine' trademark"
and should not be confused with goods bearing counterfeit trademarks. Gray market
goods are also classified as "parallel importations" when both the U.S. trademark owner
and a third party are importing the foreign-manufactured goods. Id.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982); see infra note 25.
3. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987); see infra note 43.
4. 3A R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPErTION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 26.27, at
119-20 (4th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988). The "common-control" exception, 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1987), allows importation of gray market goods if the foreign manufac-
turer and the domestic trademark holder "are owned by the same person or business
entity or the foreign and domestic trademark owners are parent and subsidiary compa-
nies or are subject to common ownership or control." Id.
5. Id. at 120. The "authorized-use" exception, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1987), allows
importation of gray market goods when the domestic trademark holder has authorized
the use of its mark by a foreign manufacturer on foreign-produced goods. Id.
6. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
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1930,1 as promulgated in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987),'
was a permissible interpretation of Section 526.1
In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that the common-
control exception, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2), which allows the
importation of foreign-produced goods bearing a valid U.S.
trademark when the foreign manufacturer is affiliated with or
owned by the U.S. trademark holder, was a permissible interpre-
tation of Section 526.10 However, a different 5-4 majority held
that the authorized-use exception, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3),
which allowed importation of foreign-manufactured goods bear-
ing a valid U.S. trademark if the U.S. trademark owner had li-
censed or assigned the use of the trademark to an independent
foreign manufacturer, was an impermissible interpretation of
Section 526."The Court's decision, upholding the common-control excep-
tion despite an apparently contrary statutory mandate, not only
underscored the vast deference that a reviewing court will give
to an agency's interpretation of a statute,1" but also was a blow
to U.S. trademark owners seeking a monopoly within the U.S.
market, which they previously thought to be conveyed by Sec-
tion 526, for their foreign-produced goods bearing U.S. trade-
marks. Additionally, the Court's decision was an apparent vic-
tory for discount retailers, who depend on gray market imports
as a source of relatively inexpensive brand name merchandise. 3
A decision invalidating the regulations in full would have al-
lowed U.S. trademark holders to sell their foreign-produced
goods in foreign markets without fear of importation of those
goods by a third party into the U.S. to compete directly with the
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982); see infra note 25.
8. See infra note 43.
9. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1814.
10. Id. at 1817. A 5-4 majority consisting of Justices Kennedy, White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens voted to uphold the common-control exception.
11. Id. A different 5-4 majority, however, consisting of Justices Kennedy, Blackmun,
Scalia, and O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to strike down the authorized-
use exception. Id.
12. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 839, 844 (1984). "[C]onsiderable
weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer .... " Id.
13. High Court Refuses To Bar Import of Gray-Market Goods: Billions at Stake, 11
L.A. Daily J., June 1, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
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trademark owners own imported goods.14
The background and legislative history of Section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 and Customs Service regulations, 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(c), will be examined in Part II of this Note. In addition,
Part II will set forth the various scenarios under which gray
market importation occurs, the Court's standard of deferential
review given to agency interpretations of congressional statutes,
and the previous decisions of the courts on the validity of 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c).
The procedural history of K Mart will be described in Part
III of this Note. The Court's decision in K Mart will be
presented in Part IV by separately examining each of three Jus-
tices' opinions on the common-control and authorized-use ex-
ceptions. Part V analyzes with particularity the statutory analy-
sis employed by the Court in reaching its conclusion that the
common-control exception of the Customs Service regulations is
a reasonable agency interpretation of Section 526. Furthermore,
Part V intimates that the Court misconstrued the intent of Con-
gress as expressed by Section 526 through the application of
flawed methods of statutory construction. Part VI concludes
that the Court was practicing judicial legislation in upholding an
agency regulation which is contrary to the plain meaning of Sec-
tion 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and whose legislative history
and purpose are at best ambiguous, in order to preserve a major
industry which provides low-cost quality goods to American con-
sumers. Additionally, Part VI suggests a method of statutory
analysis, the application of which will give greater consistency to
the courts' determination of the actual intent of a legislative
body as expressed through a statute and which will thereby re-
duce the practice of judicial legislation.
14. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 917-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
1990]
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II. Background
A. Origin of Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930
1. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 was a direct result of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel,"5 which held that an American corporation which
had purchased the United States trademark of a foreign corpo-
ration's product had no recourse against importation into the
United States of that same genuine product by a third party."6
In Katzel, a U.S. corporation purchased from a French corpora-
tion the U.S. trademark for "Java" face powder manufactured
by the French corporation.1" The Second Circuit in that case
subscribed to the "universality" theory of trademark protec-
tion,18 which protects trademarks to ensure consumers that the
article of purchase is the genuine article as represented by the
trademark."' Thus, in Katzel, the Second Circuit refused to
grant relief to the U.S. trademark holder when a domestic com-
petitor imported the genuine "Java" face powder purchased
abroad from the French manufacturer and competed on the do-
mestic market with the U.S. trademark holder.2
In response to the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel, Con-
gress enacted Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922.21 Subse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Second Circuit 22 when Justice Holmes embraced the
trademark law theory of "territoriality," which espouses a prop-
15. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
16. Id. at 543.
17. Id. at 539.
18. Under the "universality" theory of trademark law, merchandise bearing a valid
trademark according to the law of one country would not be found to infringe if im-
ported "[inito another country where the exclusive right to the mark was held by some-
one other than the owner of the merchandise." Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.
Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
19. Katzel, 275 F. at 543. "If the goods sold are the genuine goods covered by the
trade-mark, the rights of the owner of the trade-mark are not infringed." Id.
20. Id. at 540.
21. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
22. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
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erty right in the owner of the mark regardless of the origin of
the goods.23 Congress later reenacted Section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1922 in identical form24 as Section 526 of the Tariff Act of
1930.2
5
2. Legislative History of Section 526
The legislative history which accompanied the enactment of
Section 526 is limited.2 6 It includes the transcript of a short Sen-
ate floor debate on the amendment of Section 526 to the Tariff
Act of 192227 and a brief mention in the House Conference Re-
port to the Tariff Act of 1922.28 The House Conference Report
tends to show that Congress intended to accept the trademark
23. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "Emphasiz-
ing the territoriality of trademark rights, the Court [in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260
U.S. 689 (1923)] reversed the Second Circuit's holding of non-infringement." Id. Under
the territoriality theory of trademark law, "a trademark has a separate legal existence
under each country's laws, and ... its proper lawful function is [to protect] the domestic
goodwill of the domestic markholder" built up in the consumer through the domestic
markholder's business practices. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
24. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 790 F.2d at 912.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). Section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1526(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful to
import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such
merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or
organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of sections
81 to 109 of Title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of such trade-
mark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in sec-
tion 106 of said Title 15, unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.
Id.
26. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
27. 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-05 (1922).
28. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1562 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158
(1922)). The Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922),
reads as follows:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law does
not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trade-mark as mer-
chandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there
is no fraud on the public. The Senate amendment makes such importation unlaw-
ful without the consent of the owner of the American trade-mark.
5
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theory of "territoriality." '29 In addition, the Conference Report,
without explanation, added to Section 526 the requirement that
the trademark be "owned by an American citizen or
corporation."" °
During the Senate floor debate, Section 526 was amended
by adding the phrase "of foreign manufacture" after the word
"merchandise" in response to a concern by Senator Irvine Len-
root of Wisconsin. 1 Senator Lenroot feared that without this
amendment Section 526 would preclude an American citizen
from importing a good manufactured in the U.S. by a domestic
corporation bearing a U.S. trademark which had been exported
to a foreign country.3 2 Unfortunately, the last question posed by
Senator Lenroot, which probed whether Section 526 was meant
to exclude a foreign-manufactured good bearing a valid U.S.
trademark when the manufacturer and the U.S. trademark
owner were in a position of common control," was never an-
swered due to expiration of the debate's allotted time.34 In Coa-
lition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States (COPIAT), the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
Senate's lack of response to Senator Lenroot's last question im-
plied that the Senate intended Section 526 to exclude importa-
tion in situations of common control.3 5 But in Vivitar, the Fed-
eral Circuit stated "that the debate is too unfocused and
misinformed to serve as a definitive basis for interpretation of
[Section 526]." 36 In sum, the small amount of legislative history
that accompanied the enactment of Section 526 has resulted in
differing interpretations.3 7
29. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922)).
30. Id. at 911 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922)).
31. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 11,605.
34. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
35. Id.
36. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d at 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
37. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986) (enact-
ment of Section 526 to overrule Katzel does not necessarily constrain the "broad lan-
[Vol. 10:245
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B. History of the Customs Service's Administration of Section
526
Initially, the Customs Service adopted the language of Sec-
tion 526 in its regulations without reference to any exceptions to
the exclusionary protection afforded by Section 526. 8 The Cus-
toms Service created a "same person" exception fourteen years
after the enactment of Section 526.19 Further changes took place
in 1953 when the Customs Service adopted regulations including
a "related company" exception based on Section 45 of the
Trade-Mark Act of 1946 and deleted reference to Section 526 as
authority.4 In 1959, however, the agency adopted regulations re-
verting to a "same person" exception, while reinserting Section
526 as authority and deleting reference to the Trade-Mark Act
of 1946.41 The current form of the regulations was promulgated
by the agency in 1972 with the inclusion of the common-control
and authorized-use exceptions.42
The current Customs Service regulations, 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(c), provides for two basic exceptions to the exclusionary
protection of Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930."1 Importation
is not prohibited by Section 526 under the common-control ex-
guage" of the statute), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Coalition to Preserve the
Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1822
(1988) (reasonable inference" from the legislative history is that Congress intended Sec-
tion 526 to apply to all types of domestic firms); Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1563 ("floor debate
• . . is too unfocused and misinformed to serve as a definitive basis for interpreta-
tion. ... ); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(legislative history does not support a narrow interpretation of Section 526).
38. See Joint Appendix Brief at 17-18, 21-23, K Mart (Nos. 86-495, 86-624, and 86-
625) (containing Cust. Reg. 1923, art. 476; Cust. Reg. 1931, arts. 517(a), 518).
39. See id. at 27-28 (containing T.D. 48537, 70 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 336-37 (1936)).
The "same person" exception allowed the importation of foreign merchandise bearing a
valid U.S. trademark when the foreign manufacturer and the U.S. trademark holder wure
"the same person, partnership, association or corporation" despite the prohibition of
Section 526 against such importation. Id.
40. See id. at 55-59 (containing T.D. 53399, 88 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 384 (1953)).
The "related company" exception expanded upon the same person exception by requir-
ing that the foreign manufacturer and the U.S. trademark holder need only be related,
and not necessarily the same entity, to avoid the proscription of Section 526. Id.
41. See id. at 66-67 (containing 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1959)).
42. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
43. The Customs Service regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987), provide in
pertinent part that:
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ception when the foreign manufacturer and the U.S. trademark
owner are the "same person or business entity" or "are parent
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common
ownership or control."" In addition, the authorized-use excep-
tion allows importation when the mark is "applied under au-
thorization of the U.S. owner. ' 45
C. Gray Market Importation Scenarios
1. Prototypical Gray Market Situation
Gray market importation occurs in three general situations.
In the first situation, known as a prototypical gray market case,
a domestic firm has purchased from an independent foreign firm
the U.S. trademark for the foreign-manufactured goods. 6 In the
prototypical gray market situation, which is analogous to the
facts in Katzel,47 gray market importation occurs when a third
party purchases in a foreign market the foreign-manufactured
goods bearing the U.S. trademark and imports them into the
U.S. to compete directly with the U.S. trademark owner. 8
2. Common-Control Situation
The second situation under which gray market importation
occurs involves three types of domestic-foreign affiliation scena-
rios.49 These are encompassed by the common-control exception
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth ... [in] this section
do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or control... ;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner. ...
Id.
44. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1987).
45. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1987).
46. See Trademark Law, Economics and Grey-Market Policy, 62 IND. L.J. 753
(1987). In K Mart, the Court labeled the prototypical gray market situation "case 1." K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (1988).
47. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
48. See Trademark Law, Economics and Grey-Market Policy, 62 IND. L.J. 753
(1987). >
49. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
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of the Customs Service regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2).
The first scenario occurs when a foreign corporation's domestic
subsidiary owns the U.S. trademark for the foreign-produced
goods bearing that trademark." The second scenario occurs
when a U.S. based firm owns a foreign subsidiary which pro-
duces the goods bearing a U.S. trademark owned by the U.S.
firm."' The final type of domestic-foreign affiliation scenario oc-
curs when a U.S. based firm maintains a division located in a
foreign country which produces goods bearing a U.S. trademark
owned by the U.S. firm.52 Gray market importation occurs under
these scenarios if the foreign-manufactured goods bearing valid
U.S. trademarks are purchased abroad and imported by a third
party in direct competition with the U.S. trademark holder.5 1
3. Authorized-Use Situation
The third situation involving gray market importation oc-
curs when a domestic corporation licenses or assigns the use of
its U.S. trademark to a foreign firm, typically with an agreement
that the foreign firm will only sell the foreign-manufactured
goods in the foreign market .5  This situation is encompassed by
the authorized-use exception of the Customs Service regulation,
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3).5 ' As in the other two situations, gray
market importation occurs when the foreign-manufactured
goods bearing valid U.S. trademarks are purchased abroad and
States, 790 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afl'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). In K Mart, the Court labeled the
domestic-foreign affiliate scenario "case 2." K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1815.
50. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1815. In K Mart Corp., the Court further subdivided the
domestic-foreign affiliate scenario by creating three sub-classifications: (1) a foreign firm
and domestic subsidiary situation was labeled "case 2a"; (2) a domestic firm and a for-
eign subsidiary situation was labeled "case 2b"; and a domestic firm and foreign division
situation was labeled "case 2c." Id.
51. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 790 F.2d at
904.
52. 3A R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 21.17 at
81 (4th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
53. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 790 F.2d at 904.
54. 3A R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 21.17 at
81 (4th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988). In K Mart, the Court labeled a domestic firm's authori-
zation of use by an "independent foreign" firm "case 3." K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1815.
55. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 790 F.2d at
904 (giving all three exceptions).
1990]
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imported into the U.S. by a third party to compete directly with
the U.S. trademark holder. 6
D. Judicial Scrutiny of Administrative Interpretations of
Statutes
The determination of the validity of the Customs Service
regulations depends on the level of deference that a court is will-
ing to give to an agency's interpretation of a congressional stat-
ute.57 Traditionally, the courts have accorded great deference to
the administrative interpretation of statutes.6 In doing so, the
courts acknowledge the agency's specialized expertise and ex-
press a pragmatic concern to afford an agency the necessary flex-
ibility to function in an efficient manner. 9
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,e0 the seminal deci-
sion on agency interpretation of statutes,' the Court upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency's construction of the Clean
Air Act, but noted that if the intent of Congress was clearly ex-
pressed by unambiguous statutory language, then the agency
was bound to follow that intent as expressed in the statute. The
Chevron Court stated that when the statute is ambiguous on the
issue at hand, then a court's quest is to determine whether the
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.6 2 If the stat-
utory mandate is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable, then the courts will uphold the validity of the regu-
lation despite questions surrounding "the wisdom of the
56. Id.
57. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20
(1979). The Court refused to defer to the SEC interpretation that noncontributory pen-
sion plans were covered by the Securities Acts because the agency interpretation was
new and contrary to past SEC positions. Id. at 566.
58. Id. at 566 n.20.
59. Id.
60. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. Prior to Chevron, the Court's standard of review of agency interpretations of
statutes vacillated between a "reasonableness standard," which required an agency inter-
pretation to have a rational basis, and a "rightness standard," under which the Court
determined whether the agency interpretation matched the Court's independent con-
struction of the statute. Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statu-
tory Interpretation: Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985
Du"E L.J. 469 (1985). The decision in Chevron provided a consistent method of review
with a "coherent framework for structuring judicial review in this area." Id. at 477.
62. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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agency's policy ... ."6
To determine the intent of Congress as expressed in the
statute, a court will look to "its language, purpose, and his-
tory."6 Despite the plain meaning rule,6 5 courts will commonly
look outside the language of the statute to ascertain the true
meaning of a statutory mandate. 6 If the intent of Congress on
the specific issue is ambiguous, then the court must determine if
the agency regulation is reasonable by "examination of the legis-
lation and its history .... ..
Furthermore, an agency interpretation which represents a
"longstanding and consistent" agency position is accorded
heightened deference.6 8 An agency interpretation which is shown
to be inconsistent with past agency positions, however, is given
less deference by the reviewing court. 9
E. Precedent: Validity of the Customs Service Regulations
In the early 1980's, the strong dollar in overseas markets al-
lowed for the economically favorable purchase of goods of for-
eign manufacture for import into the United States."0 This re-
sulted in a rash of litigation invoking the exclusionary protection
mandated by Section 526 and challenging the validity of the
Customs Service regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c), when genuine
goods of foreign manufacture, bearing valid U.S. trademarks,
63. Id. at 866.
64. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 438 U.S. 551, 566 n.20
(1979).
65. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). "It is elementary that the
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the
act is framed, and if that is plain .... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." Id.
66. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). See also Murphy, Old
Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1301 (1975). "[Tlhe plain meaning
rule was never as widely practiced as preached." Id.
67. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
68. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (the consistent 80
year application of an agency interpretation deserves considerable deference).
69. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (an agency interpretation
which changed at least three times between 1965 and 1985 is not given the considerable
deference of a consistent agency position).
70. S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON, P. MAGGS & R. SCHECTER, UNFAIR rRADE PRACTICES
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 12 (4th ed. Supp. 1986).
1990]
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were imported by a third party without the consent of the U.S.
trademark owner.7 1 The decisions of three United States Courts
of Appeals highlighted the split among the circuits on the valid-
ity of the Customs Service regulations and the exclusionary pro-
tection provided by Section 526.72
First, in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to
Section 133.21(c) of the Customs Service regulations as being in-
consistent with Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by holding
that the regulations were a "reasonable exercise of administra-
tively initiated enforcement. '7 -' After an extensive review of the
available legislative history, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Congress did not intend to limit the exclusionary protection
mandated by Section 526.74 Moreover, the Federal Circuit re-
jected the assertion that the regulation deserved especially vast
deference because it represented a longstanding administrative
position.75 The Federal Circuit found, however, that the regula-
tions were valid as an exercise of the Customs Service's adminis-
trative enforcement, but did not reflect the potential protection
afforded by Section 526.76 Furthermore, the court held that the
71. Id. See, e.g., Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla.
1985) (granted injunction against the importation by a third party of "Trivial Pursuit"
games made in Canada by the licensor of the mark to the U.S. plaintiff where the licen-
sor itself was precluded from importing into the U.S. by the terms of the license); Osawa
& Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granted preliminary injunc-
tion against gray market imports); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service,
575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (denied preliminary injunction against gray market
importation of "Oscar de la Renta" fragrances where a single international enterprise
was evidence of common control).
72. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986) ("congres-
sional acquiescence in the longstanding administrative interpretation of the statute legit-
imizes that interpretation as an exercise of Customs' enforcement discretion."); Coalition
to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 918
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) ("the Customs regulations in question... are contrary to Section
526 ... and hence unlawful."); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)("the regulations ... are upheld as a reasonable exercise of administratively
initiated enforcement"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
73. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
74. Id. at 1565.
75. Id. at 1568 ("Customs has had continuing questions concerning the reading of
the statute.").
76. Id. at 1570-71.
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trademark owner could assert its rights under Section 526 in a
private action in district court to enjoin a third party from im-
porting the trademark owner's goods."
In Olympus Corp. v. United Statess the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the validity of
the Customs Service regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c). The
court relied on the lack of congressional action against gray mar-
ket importation when Section 526 was amended in 1978, not-
withstanding Congress' knowledge of the practice.79 Thus, the
Second Circuit held that congressional acquiescence to the Cus-
toms Service's longstanding interpretation of Section 526 vali-
dated the agency's interpretation of Section 526 as an exercise of
its enforcement discretion."
Just prior to the Olympus decision, however, the D.C. Cir-
cuit in COPIAT invalidated the Customs Service regulations, 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c), due to their inconsistency with the exclusion-
ary protection mandated by Section 526.81 The D.C. Circuit re-
jected the enforcement discretion argument relied upon by the
Vivitar and Olympus courts.82 The split among the circuits set
the stage for review of the validity of the regulations by the
United States Supreme Court. 3
III. Procedure of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trade-
marks (COPIAT) is an organization of United States trademark
owners, which includes among its members, Cartier, Inc. and
77. Id. at 1570.
78. 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986).
79. Id. The amendment created an exception to the bar against importation when
the goods were imported by an individual for personal use. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1988).
80. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986).
81. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. K Mart v.
Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). "In light of the language of the statute, its legislative
history and purpose, and the contemporaneous constructions placed upon it, [the court
concluded] that Section 526 simply cannot be limited in the manner that the Customs
Service has attempted." Id.
82. Id. at 918. "From the start, the Customs Service has regarded the regulations as
its interpretation of what the law requires rather than as a decision not to prosecute to
the letter of the law." Id.
83. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 479 U.S.
1005 (1986).
1990]
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd."' COPIAT and its two aforemen-
tioned members brought an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory relief
against the validity of the Customs Service regulations, 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c), and an order directing the agency to enforce
the express exclusionary mandate of Section 526.85 COPIAT's
members, distributors and manufacturers of goods bearing valid
U.S. trademarks, alleged that third parties were importing these
goods bearing U.S. trademarks owned by the individual mem-
bers of COPIAT in contradiction to the proscription of Section
526.86 The defendants to the action included the United States,
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of the Cus-
toms Service.8 7 Thereafter, K Mart Corporation, a large nation-
wide retailer, and 47th Street Photo, a New York City camera
retailer, both of whom participate heavily in gray market impor-
tation as major discounters, joined the action as intervenor-de-
fendants 8 After determining that it had subject-matter juris-
diction,89 the district court upheld the validity of the regulation
finding that "the legislative history, judicial decisions, legislative
acquiescence, and longstanding consistent policy of the Customs
Service" justified the agency's interpretation of Section 526 as
reasonable.90 Thus, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment."'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia affirmed the jurisdictional finding,92 but re-
versed the lower court's decision, holding that the Customs Ser-
vice regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c), were an unreasonable
84. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, 790 F.2d at 904.
85. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.
Ct. 1811 (1988).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 847.
90. Id. at 852.
91. Id. at 853.
92. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
[Vol. 10:245
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/6
K MART v. CARTIER
interpretation of Section 526."8 The circuit court remanded the
case to the district court with "instructions to issue a declara-
tory judgment that the Customs regulations in question, 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3), are contrary to Section 526 ...and
hence unlawful. '94
Thereafter, COPIAT and its members appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which first granted certiorari on
the question of jurisdiction, and subsequently affirmed the court
of appeals decision holding that the district court had jurisdic-
tion.95 Subsequently, the Court heard arguments on the merits,
and thereafter affirmed the court of appeals in part and reversed
in part.96
IV. Supreme Court's Decision: K Mart Corp. v. Cartier
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,97 the Court upheld the va-
lidity of the common-control exception of the Customs Service
regulations as a reasonable agency interpretation of Section 526,
but struck down the authorized-use exception of the Customs
Service regulations as an impermissible interpretation of Section
526 in light of the plain meaning of the statute 8
A. The Common-Control Exception
1. Justice Kennedy's Controlling Opinion99
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice White, held that the
common-control exception of the Customs Service regulations,
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2), was a valid agency interpretation of
93. Id. at 918.
94. Id.
95. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988). The Court rejected the
argument of COPIAT and its members that the Court of International Trade had exclu-
sive jurisdiction, and found that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction. Id. at
955-56.
96. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988).
97. Id. at 1811.
98. Id. at 1817.
99. Technically, there was neither a majority nor a plurality opinion of the Court
upholding the common-control exception. See BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1039 (5th ed.
1979)(defining plurality). Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined by Justice White, in combi-
nation with Justice Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, pro-
vided the necessary votes to uphold the common-control exception.
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Section 526.100 In applying the rationale of Chevron,10 1 he deter-
mined that Section 526 was sufficiently ambiguous in the con-
text of the common-control situation to make the Customs Ser-
vice's interpretation a reasonable one.102 Justice Kennedy found
ambiguity in two separate phrases of Section 526.103 First, he
concluded that the phrase "owned by" in Section 526 is ambigu-
ous in a common-control situation involving a foreign parent be-
cause of the inability to conclude whether the foreign parent or
its U.S. subsidiary is the actual owner of the United States
trademark.104 Second, he determined that the phrase "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture" in Section 526 is ambiguous when
applied to a common-control situation involving a foreign sub-
sidiary or division because the phrase could be interpreted "to
mean (1) goods manufactured in a foreign country, (2) goods
manufactured by a foreign company, or (3) goods manufactured
in a foreign country by a foreign company. "105 Thus, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the common-control exception of the
Customs Service regulations was a reasonable interpretation of
Section 526 in light of "the imprecision in the statute .... "
2. Justice Brennan's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, upheld the common-control exception as
a valid agency interpretation of Section 526.107 Justice Brennan,
while relying on the same statutory ambiguities perceived by
100. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817-18.
101. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 839, 844 (1984) (If the statute is
ambiguous on the issue at hand, then the agency interpretation is valid if it is
reasonable.).
102. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817-18.
103. Id. at 1818.
104. Id. The entire Court agreed that the phrase "owned by" was ambiguous in a
situation involving a foreign parent and domestic subsidiary "case 2a," but this ambigu-
ity did not extend to the other two categories, namely the domestic parent and foreign
subsidiary or division situations "cases 2b & 2c," encompassed under the "common-con-
trol" exception. Id. Therefore, the intent of Congress as expressed in the phrase "mer-
chandise of foreign manufacture" was crucial in determining the validity of the common-
control exception.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1819-20 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy," 8 also looked to the "purpose and the legisla-
tive history of Section 526" to ascertain the intent of Congress
in enacting Section 526.109 He argued that the congressional pur-
pose was to protect domestic interests, and therefore, Congress
did not intend to extend the exclusionary protection of Section
526 to foreign corporations affiliated with U.S. trademark hold-
ers.110 Moreover, Justice Brennan contended that "[t]he sparse
legislative history confirms that Congress' sole goal was to over-
rule Katzel," and thus, Section 526 prohibited prototypical gray
market importation only."' Consequently, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the Customs Service's interpretation precluding for-
eign affiliates from taking advantage of the exclusionary protec-
tion of Section 526 is reasonable. 1 2 Furthermore, Justice
Brennan argued that the validity of the common-control excep-
tion, as promulgated by the Customs Service in 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(c)(1)-(2), "is further buttressed by the deference owed to
an agency interpretation that represents a longstanding agency
position."1' 3
3. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, con-
cluded that the common-control exception is contrary to the ex-
press mandate of Section 526, and therefore is an impermissible
agency interpretation." 4 Justice Scalia argued that the phrase
"merchandise of foreign manufacture" in Section 526 is unam-
biguous and that the majority only makes it ambiguous by tak-
ing it out of the context of the statute as a whole." 5 He con-
108. See id. at 1821. "[Ilt is unclear whether merchandise manufactured abroad by
a division or a subsidiary of a domestic firm is 'merchandise of foreign manufacture.'
That phrase could readily be interpreted to mean either 'merchandise manufactured in a
foreign country' or 'merchandise manufactured by a foreigner.'" Id.
109. Id. at 1822.
110. Id. at 1820-21.
111. Id. at 1824.
112. Id. at 1826-27.
113. Id. at 1827. "Treasury has for 50 years adhered to the basic premise of the
common-control exception - that Section 526 does not require exclusion of all gray-
market goods." Id.
114. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1831-32. Justice Scalia contended that the majority's "approach would
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tended that the phrase "merchandise of foreign manufacture"
clearly means goods manufactured abroad based on its common
usage. " " Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's
interpretation defeats the statute's prohibition against prototyp-
ical gray market importation when a foreign firm has licensed its
trademark to a domestic firm for use in the U.S. and to another
U.S. firm for use in a foreign market.11 7 Moreover, he contended
that the Customs Service's own interpretation of the regulations
shows that "foreign manufacture" means produced abroad. "
Lastly, Justice Scalia noted that the majority's interpretation of
the regulations requires the Customs Service to perform the im-
practical differentiation of goods manufactured abroad from
those manufactured by foreigners.' 9 Consequently, Justice
Scalia found that the Customs Service common-control excep-
tion is invalid because it burdens the "agency with an interpre-
tation that it not only has never suggested, but that is contrary
to ordinary usage [and] to the purposes of the statute ... 12
B. The Authorized-Use Exception
1. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun, Scalia,
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the author-
ized-use exception, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3), is an impermissible
interpretation of Section 526.121 Unlike the common-control sit-
uation, he found that when the foreign manufacturer is an inde-
pendent foreign corporation, the phrases "owned by" and "mer-
chandise of foreign manufacture" in Section 526 are not in any
also interpret the phrase 'I have a foreign object in my eye' as referring, perhaps, to
something from Italy." Id.
116. Id. at 1832.
117. Id. The domestic firm would not be able to exclude "gray-market imports man-
ufactured abroad by the other American firms" because the merchandise "would not be
'of foreign manufacture.' " Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1833. Customs must differentiate, under the sustained regulation, be-
tween items merely produced abroad and those produced by foreigners, when only the
country of origin is presently required on imports. Id.
120. Id.
121. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1819.
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way ambiguous. 22 Justice Kennedy concluded, therefore, that
the authorized-use exception is in direct contradiction to the
mandate of Section 526, and thereby is an impermissible inter-
pretation of Section 526. s
Justice Kennedy went on to find, however, that the author-
ized-use exception was severable from the Customs Service regu-
lations as a whole, so that the common-control exception would
survive. 124 According to Justice Kennedy, the authorized-use ex-
ception could be severed from the regulations without impairing
"the function of the statute as a whole" and that this would not
frustrate the intent of the regulations. 25
2. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, supported
the majority's decision to invalidate the authorized-use excep-
tion due to its inconsistency with the express mandate of Sec-
tion 526.126 Justice Scalia reasserted the majority's position by
finding no ambiguity in Section 526 when "a domestic trade-
mark owner and registrant authorizes a foreign firm to use its
U.S. trademark abroad. 1 2 7 Contrary to Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the phrase "owned
by" is not ambiguous because, at the time of enactment of Sec-
tion 526, there was licensing of trademarks to unrelated busi-
nesses located in separate geographic regions.12 8 Thus, Justice
Scalia concluded that the legislature was well aware of the effect
of using the statement "owned by" for licensees and assignees of
122. Id. at 1818.
123. Id. at 1818-19.
124. Id. at 1819. Justice Kennedy deemed that severance of the authorized-use ex-
ception would not impair the function of the statute as a whole and that there was no
indication that the entire regulation would not have been passed but for its conclusion.
Id.
125. Id.
126. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 1833. "There, the U.S. trademark is unambiguously 'owned by' a U.S.
firm, and registered by a firm 'domiciled in the United States,' and the goods sought to
be imported are 'of foreign manufacture.'" Id.
128. Id. at 1835. "By 1920, it was firmly established that unrelated businesses could
own and use an identical trademark so long as the uses were confined to different and
distinct regions." Id.
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trademarks at the time of enactment. 129 Furthermore, in reply to
Justice Brennan's dissent, Justice Scalia contended that it is far
from clear that changed circumstances have given rise to a situa-
tion so drastic from the original purpose of the statute that the
Court should disregard the plain meaning of the statute. 30 Con-
sequently, Justice Scalia found that Congress intended the ex-
clusionary scope of Section 526 to extend to importation allowed
under the Customs Service's authorized-use exception, and thus
the regulations were an impermissible agency interpretation of
Section 526.' s '
3. Justice Brennan's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Stevens, dissented from the majority opinion that struck down
the authorized-use exception.'32 He argued that the phrase
"owned by" in Section 526 is ambiguous because trademarks
could not be licensed or assigned at the time of enactment of the
original statute. 3 Consequently, Justice Brennan found that
the legislature did not intend to extend the exclusionary protec-
tion of Section 526 to U.S. trademark holders who licensed or
assigned their trademarks to be used in a foreign market. 3 " He
also argued that the legislative history shows that Congress' sole
purpose in enacting Section 526 was to overrule Katzel.3 5 In ad-
dition, Justice Brennan contended that since 1951, the Customs
Service's position has been to deny protection to "trademark
holders who authorize the use of their trademarks abroad." ' 6
129. Id. at 1836.
130. Id. at 1835. The clear intent of Congress as expressed in a statute may be disre-
garded by the court in light of changed circumstances "only when (1) it is clear that the
alleged changed circumstances were unknown to, and unenvisioned by, the enacting leg-
islature, and (2) it is clear that they cause the challenged application of the statute to
exceed its original purpose." Id.
131. Id. at 1836.
132. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1819, 1828 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1828-29. Justice Brennan argued that since assignment of a trademark
was not possible under the prevailing trademark theory at the time of enactment of Sec-
tion 526, Congress did not comprehend the meaning of ownership of a mark in the same
manner as would be understood under current trademark theory; thus, the intent of
Congress expressed by the phrase "owned by" is unclear. Id.
134. Id. at 1829.
135. Id. at 1830.
136. Id. Thus, Justice Brennan argued that the authorized-use exception was a long-
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Therefore, Justice Brennan found the authorized-use exception
to be a reasonable agency interpretation of Section 526.111
V. Analysis: K Mart Corp. v. Cartier
The Court engaged in judicial legislation in upholding the
validity of the common-control exception through faulty appli-
cation of the rules of statutory construction. The determination
of the validity of an agency interpretation of a statute is wholly
dependent upon the reviewing court's finding of legislative in-
tent based on statutory interpretation. 13 8 Therefore, the manner
in which the court applies the rules of statutory construction is
of primary importance in affecting the outcome of the court's
decision. While the courts give great deference to agency inter-
pretations, this deference is limited by "the clear meaning of the
statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history."139
The K Mart Court, in upholding the common-control excep-
tion, extended great deference to an agency interpretation which
is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of Section 526. Through
a contorted application of statutory construction, the Court con-
cluded that the phrase "merchandise of foreign manufacture" is
ambiguous because it might not encompass goods manufactured
abroad by United States citizens or corporate entities. Thus, the
Court reasoned that the agency interpretation expressed in the
common-control exception was reasonable due to the ambiguity
of Section 526.
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 526
The majority, upholding the validity of the common-control
exception, ignored the plain meaning of the phrase "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture" in Section 526. In construing the
meaning of a statute, a court starts first with the language. 40 In
its strictest form, the plain meaning rule requires a court to en-
standing agency position requiring appreciable deference by the reviewing court. Id.
137. Id. at 1831.
138. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
139. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20
(1979). See also supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
140. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983) (stating that "in
determining the scope of a statute, one is to look first at its language.").
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force the clear mandate of statutory language without reference
to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent."" In determining the
meaning of statutory language a court should "assume that the
ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed 'accu-
rately expresses the legislative purpose.' ""2 On its face, the
meaning of Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is quite ex-
plicit." s Therefore, as argued by Justice Scalia in his dissent,
the phrase "merchandise of foreign manufacture" clearly means
manufactured abroad. 1 4 In contending that "merchandise of
foreign manufacture" could mean "merchandise manufactured
by a foreigner" as opposed to merchandise manufactured by a
U.S. citizen or corporation in a foreign country," 5 the majority
strays far from any ordinary meaning.
Furthermore, legislatures will "generally use a particular
word with a consistent meaning in a given context."'"64 The
phrase "foreign manufacture" is typically used in statutes to de-
note a product which is manufactured abroad."17 Therefore, the
majority's finding of textual ambiguity in the phrase "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture" in a situation of common control
was erroneous. Consequently, if a strict plain meaning rule of
statutory interpretation was applied to Section 526, the unam-
biguous exclusionary protection afforded by the statute would
require the court to invalidate the common-control exception.
Typically, however, courts which apply the plain meaning
rule in statutory construction will look beyond the unambiguous
141. See supra note 65.
142. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc.
v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). See also Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at
194 ("Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and
the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the leg-
islative purpose.").
143. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1980). Section 526 prohibits the importation of "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture" bearing "a trademark owned by" a U.S. citizen or corpora-
tion, without the permission of the U.S. trademark holder. Id. See supra note 25.
144. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1832 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
145. Id. at 1831.
146. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972).
147. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a) (1988). The regulation denotes "[a]rticles of for-
eign or domestic manufacture," and thus implies that foreign manufacture pertains to
goods manufactured abroad and not to goods made in the U.S. Id.
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language of the statute to determine legislative intent.1 8 This is
indeed the better rule, for it avoids enforcing the mandate of
unambiguous statutory language when there is clear evidence of
contrary legislative intent.149 However, if the language of the
statute is clear, a court requires "a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary" in order to disregard the seemingly
unambiguous language. 50 Thus, since the language of Section
526 unambiguously precludes the importation of gray market
goods in several types of common-control situations and in the
authorized-use situation, the legislative history must be ex-
amined for any clear congressional intent to the contrary.
B. Congressional Intent
The intent of Congress as expressed by the available legisla-
tive history is far from clear. There is no question that the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Katzel precipitated the enactment of
Section 526.151 However, the intended scope of the exclusionary
protection afforded by Section 526 cannot be unambiguously de-
fined from the existing legislative history.
Justice Brennan, realizing the tenuous nature of the Court's
finding of ambiguity in the statutory language, 1 2 properly ex-
plored the legislative history and purpose of Section 526 in order
to determine congressional intent.153 Justice Kennedy, relying on
his finding of ambiguous language, 54 and Justice Scalia, appar-
ently adopting the strict "plain meaning rule" of statutory con-
struction, 55 erroneously neglected to fully consider the legisla-
148. See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statu-
tory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1301
(1975).
149. See W. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 75-76 (2d ed. 1984).
150. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1982). See also Jefferon
County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 157 (1983)
(stating that "[t]he plain language of the Act is controlling unless a different legislative
intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the Act.").
151. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
152. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1821 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Even if the language of
§ 526 clearly covered all affiliates of foreign manufacturers" the purpose and intention of
the legislature must be considered.).
153. Id. at 1822.
154. See K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1818.
155. See id. at 1831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tive history behind Section 526.
The truly ambiguous nature of the existing legislative his-
tory is evidenced by the previous findings of several courts. In
Vivitar, after an in-depth review of the existing legislative his-
tory, the court concluded "that no limitations, based on indica-
tions of congressional intent at the time of enactment, can be
read into [Section 526]. ' '156 Moreover, in Coalition to Preserve
the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the legislative history
demonstrated that Congress intended Section 526 to include
within its prohibitory scope those goods encompassed by the
common-control and authorized-use exceptions.'57 Although Jus-
tice Brennan determined that the legislative history revealed
"that Congress had a contrary intent," he did admit that evi-
dence existed "suggesting that some legislators might have un-
derstood § 526 otherwise."' 58 While Justice Brennan was able to
draw different inferences from the existing legislative history
than the COPIAT and Vivitar courts,' 59 this is far from the clear
showing of contrary intent necessary to disturb the plain mean-
ing of Section 526.160
Therefore, since the legislative history of Section 526 does
not reveal a clearly contrary intent on the part of Congress to
the unambiguous charge of the statutory language, that clear
statutory mandate must be adhered to by the interpreting
agency.' 6 ' The Customs Service common-control exception al-
lows the importation of foreign-manufactured goods bearing a
valid U.S. trademark owned by a domestic firm affiliated with
the foreign manufacturer.'62 The authorized-use exception al-
lows the importation of foreign-manufactured goods bearing a
legitimate U.S. trademark owned by a domestic firm which has
156. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
157. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 912-13 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
158. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1822 (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra notes 26-37.
159. See K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1824-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
160. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1982).
161. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 839, 842-43 (1984). "If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id.
162. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1987). See supra note 43.
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licensed or assigned to the foreign manufacturer the use of that
trademark in the foreign market. 63 On its face, Section 526 pro-
hibits the importation of "merchandise of foreign manufacture"
bearing "a trademark owned by" a U.S. citizen or corporation
without the permission of the U.S. trademark owner."" Clearly,
the common-control and authorized-use exceptions are contrary
to the express mandate of Section 526. Thus, the majority of the
K Mart Court, striking down the authorized-use exception, 65
properly recognized the clear inconsistency between the regula-
tions and Section 526. However, the majority, upholding the
common-control exception, 66 failed to recognize the blatant in-
consistency between the regulations and the statute. The valida-
tion of the common-control exception was a consequence of the
Court's failure to properly construe Section 526 and thus re-
sulted in a decision smacking of judicial legislation.
C. Longstanding Administrative Practices
Courts extend vast deferential consideration to "longstand-
ing and consistent" agency positions.1 6 7 However, this deference
is limited when the agency position is clearly contrary to the in-
tent of Congress as unambiguously expressed by the governing
statute."'6 Therefore, based on plain statutory meaning and the
lack of any clear congressional intent to the contrary, the Cus-
toms Service interpretation of Section 526 did not deserve the
considerable deference normally attributed to an agency
interpretation.
Furthermore, an agency interpretation of a statute having a
history of inconsistency is given far less deference than a consis-
tent agency position.1 9 Justice Brennan, after failing to find the
clear intent of Congress from the language of Section 526170 ar-
gued that the Customs Service position, as promulgated under
the regulations, was a longstanding and consistent interpretation
163. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1987). See supra note 43.
164. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). See supra note 25.
165. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
166. Id.
167. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
170. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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deserving of considerable deference. 171 However, the reality is
that the wording and scope of the regulations have changed
many times since the original enactment of Section 526.172 Jus-
tice Brennan, relying on a Customs Service official's correspon-
dence7 3 and an abstract of a Bureau decision,174 found that de-
spite the changing language of the regulations, the agency
position had actually remained unchanged.1 75 Reliance on a Cus-
toms Service official's correspondence to show a longstanding
consistent position is, at best, tenuous. This reliance is further
eroded by contrary evidence showing an inconsistent agency po-
sition.176 In Vivitar, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
concluded that the Customs Service interpretation of Section
526 over the years had shown appreciable inconsistency. 177 Thus,
the Customs Service's common-control and authorized-use ex-
ceptions were not entitled to the vast deference typically ex-
tended to a longstanding consistent agency position because: (1)
the clearly expressed intent of Congress was contrary to the
agency position; and (2) the agency interpretation of the statute
over time had lacked uniformity.
D. The K Mart Decision Rescues a Major Industry
The Court's decision in K Mart is particularly suspect in
light of the thriving multi-billion dollar industry which is depen-
dent upon the questionable Customs Service regulations.178 The
171. Id. at 1827.
172. See Joint Appendix Brief at 17-51, 55-61, 65-67, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (Nos. 86-495, 86-624 and 86-625) (containing a history of the
Customs Service regulations interpreting Section 526). See supra notes 38-42 and accom-
panying text.
173. See id. at 63 (a letter by Deputy Customs Commissioner B. Flinn dated March
15th, 1963, stating that the agency considers a "foreign parent or subsidiary corporation
of an American trademark owner" exempt from the import prohibition of Section 526).
174. See id. at 65. This Bureau of Customs decisions abstract, T.D. 69-12(2) (1969),
recognized the common-control exception. Id.
175. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1827-28.
176. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). See also Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked
Merchandise--The Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP.
301, 309-11 (1969) (Customs Law Specialist recognizing the inconsistent agency position
as early as 1969).
177. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
178. See High Court Refuses to Bar Import of Grey-Market Goods: Billions at
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economic reach of the threatened industry juxtaposed with the
peculiar method of statutory interpretation employed by the
Court strongly suggests that the Court engaged in judicial legis-
lation. While a majority of the Court may perceive the prohibi-
tion of gray market goods as an unfair result, both for the indus-
try and the consumer, not all commentators are in agreement
with such a perception. 179 The consumer may benefit directly
from lower cost imports, but at the same time may suffer from
the reduced service and warranty backing incident to gray mar-
ket goods.'8 0 The pros and cons of gray market importation,
however, are to be weighed by the legislature as it formulates
policy and not by the courts as they interpret the legislatures'
decisions. 8' Thus, in K Mart, the Court erred by upholding the
common-control exception in the face of a clearly contrary con-
gressional statute by contorting the rules of statutory construc-
tion to achieve a result of perceived fairness in the eyes of the
Court.
VI. Conclusion
The Court, through the misapplication of the rules of statu-
tory construction, practiced judicial legislation in upholding the
Customs Service common-control regulations, 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(c)(1)-(2), even though it was clearly contrary to the un-
ambiguous intent of Congress as expressed in Section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930. The motive behind this decision rests on the
existence of a major industry providing discount brand name
Stake, L.A. Daily J., June 1, 1988, at 1, col. 2. Justice Brennan noted that agency inter-
pretations which have resulted in "an immense domestic retail industry" should be given
vast deference. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1828 (Brennan, J., concurring).
179. See Trademark Law, Economics and Gray-Market Policy, 62 IND. L.J. 753, 777
(1987) (concluding that Section 526 should be strictly enforced to benefit consumers aaid
foster the goals of the trademark laws).
180. Id.
181. Two legislative proposals directed at gray market importation are currently
before Congress. Congressman Rod Chandler of Washington introduced a bill (H.R. 771)
on February 2, 1989, which would permit importation of gray-market goods meeting ei-
ther the common-control or authorized-use exceptions, and thus would codify the Cus-
toms Service regulations at issue. 37 BNA's PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 917, at
327 (1989). In contrast, Utah's Senator Orrin G. Hatch's bill (S. 626), introduced on
March 16, 1989, would completely exclude importation of gray market goods. 37 BNA's
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 923, at 543-45 (1989).
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merchandise which has evolved as a result of the Customs Ser-
vice regulations at issue. Despite the perceived inequities of a
statute, the courts must enforce the clear and unambiguous in-
tent of Congress to avoid the practice of judicial legislation. In
pursuit of this often elusive legislative intent, it is imperative
that the courts adhere to a consistent and rational manner of
statutory construction to avoid judicial decisions which usurp
the legislative function.
The practice of judicial legislation is best avoided through
the consistent application of rational rules of statutory construc-
tion. Common sense dictates, as do the courts,181 that determi-
nation of legislative intent must start with the language by
which the legislature has attempted to express its intent. If the
language imparts a clear intent derived from the common usage
of such language, then a presumption arises in favor of that clear
intent.183 Rational and pragmatic reasoning, however, requires
that such a presumption be rebuttable by legislative history and
purpose evidencing a clear contrary intent on the part of the leg-
islature.1 84 The consistent application of the preceding logical
path of statutory analysis, while not alleviating fully the inher-
ent difficulties of statutory construction, would lead to a reduc-
tion in decisions smarting of judicial legislation.
In K Mart, the Court's statutory analysis is extremely sus-
pect, leading to the conclusion that the Court engaged in judicial
legislation. This is apparent by the finding of ambiguities in the
face of statutory language, the common meaning of which read-
ily portrayed a clear and unambiguous intent, and where the leg-
islative history and purpose were at best ambiguous. While the
Court may have wished to preserve a major industry providing
low-cost quality goods to the American consumer, that decision
was not before the Court and is properly the province of
Congress.
Raymond R. Mandra
182. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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